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Understanding Recreational Fishers’ Compliance with No-take Zones in
the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park
Adrian Arias 1,2 and Stephen G. Sutton 2,3
ABSTRACT. Understanding fishers’ compliance is essential for the successful management of marine protected areas. We used
the random response technique (RRT) to assess recreational fishers’ compliance with no-take zones in the Great Barrier Reef
Marine Park (GBRMP). The RRT allowed the asking of a sensitive question, i.e., “Did you, knowingly, fish within in a Green
Zone during the last 12 months?” while protecting respondents’ confidentiality. Application of the RRT through a survey of
recreational fishers indicated that the majority of recreational fishers, 90%, comply with no-take zones. Likewise, most fishers,
92%, reported not personally knowing anyone who had intentionally fished in a no-take zone, indicating that fishers’ perceive
high levels of compliance among their peers. Fishers were motivated to comply with no-take zones primarily by their beliefs
about penalties for noncompliance, followed by beliefs about the fishery benefits of no-take zones. Results suggest that
compliance-related communication efforts by the managing authority have partially succeeded in maintaining appropriate
compliance levels and that future efforts should accentuate normative compliance drivers that will encourage voluntary
compliance. We conclude that compliance monitoring should be integrated into the adaptive management of the GBRMP and
other protected areas; in this case social surveys using the RRT are effective tools.
Key Words: compliance; false consensus effect; Great Barrier Reef; illegal fishing; marine protected area; marine reserve; no-
take zones; poaching; random response technique (RRT); recreational fishing
INTRODUCTION
The Great Barrier Reef (GBR) is the largest coral reef system
in the world and an environment of outstanding cultural and
natural value. Most of the GBR is within the multiple use Great
Barrier Reef Marine Park (GBRMP), which uses an extensive
zoning system to manage human activities such as fishing,
recreation, and tourism (GBRMPA 1994, Day 2002). In 2004,
the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority introduced a
zoning plan that increased no-take zones, commonly known
as Green Zones, from less than 5% to 33% of the park’s area,
with the remainder of the park open to multiple forms of fishing
(GBRMPA 2004). The primary aim of the rezoning was to
increase the level of protection afforded to the biodiversity of
the GBR (Fernandes et al. 2005). Stakeholder responses to the
2004 zoning plan were mixed, with significant opposition
coming from some segments of the recreational and
commercial fishing communities (Sutton and Tobin 2009,
McCook et al. 2010, Lédée et al. 2012). 
The ecological effectiveness of the GBRMP is highly
dependent on users’ compliance (McCook et al. 2010).
Available data postrezoning suggests that compliance with the
2004 GBR zoning plan is incomplete and that recreational
fishing accounts for most of the offenses related to zoning
within the park (McCook et al. 2010). Noncompliance with
zoning by recreational fishers can potentially have a negative
impact on protected ecosystems and reduce the likelihood of
achieving conservation goals (Lester and Halpern 2008).
Consequently, there is a strong need to better understand the
level of zoning compliance among recreational fishers in the
GBRMP and the factors that influence fishers’ decisions to
comply with zoning regulations. Reliable estimates of
compliance can aid in determining the environmental impact
of infractions, in understanding how enforcement affects
compliance, and in distributing staff in the right numbers,
times, and places (Cowles et al. 1979). A better understanding
of compliance levels can also help gauge management
effectiveness in the GBRMP and the level of acceptance of
the zoning plan by local communities (Alder 1996, Ham
2009). 
Estimating noncompliance of recreational fishers with spatial
zoning in an area the size of the GBRMP is difficult. Currently
used methods for monitoring recreational fishers’ compliance
in the GBRMP include aerial and vessel-based surveillance,
indirect observation, e.g., discarded gear on reefs, and reports
of illegal activity from GBRMP users (McCook et al. 2010).
However, these methods can be logistically and economically
inefficient and potentially misleading if reported or interpreted
outside of the context in which the information was collected
(Cowles et al. 1979, Gavin et al. 2010, McCook et al. 2010). 
Surveys of recreational fishers have the potential to provide
cost-effective information about compliance in the GBRMP.
However, two major sources of bias arise in social surveys,
especially if asking sensitive questions, e.g., noncompliance
with regulations, when: (1) people refuse to participate, i.e., a
nonresponse bias; and/or (2) those who participate provide
false information, i.e., a response bias (Hansen et al. 1993). A
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survey in which fishers feel comfortable sharing information
about their compliance/noncompliance with GBRMP zoning
would reduce bias and supply valuable data for estimating
compliance rates and for designing strategies to improve
compliance. The Random Response Technique (Warner 1965)
is a promising survey methodology for asking sensitive
questions that could potentially be employed to investigate
compliance levels in the GBRMP. 
The RRT has been successfully used to investigate areas such
as sexual behaviors, abortion, gambling, drug use, cheating,
and stealing (Fox and Tracy 1986). Despite its use in the social
sciences, the method has not been fully exploited by natural
resource managers. Nonetheless, it has been used to
investigate noncompliance in freshwater recreational fishing
(Schill and Kline 1995, St. John et al. 2010) and illegal use of
terrestrial (Wright 1980, Solomon et al. 2007, St. John et al.
2012) and marine (Chaloupka 1985, Blank and Gavin 2009)
resources. Lensvelt-Mulders et al. (2005) conducted a meta-
analysis of RRT studies and concluded that the technique
provides significantly more valid results compared to other
methods, especially as the sensitivity of questions increases.
We tested the utility of using RRT for estimating recreational
fishers’ level of noncompliance with GBRMP zoning, and to
explore recreational fishers’ attitudes and beliefs about
compliance in the GBRMP.
METHODS
Random Response Technique allows survey participants to
respond to a sensitive question while maintaining
confidentiality, thereby increasing the probability of truthful
answers (Fox and Tracy 1986). Typically, a randomizing
device with known probabilities is used to determine whether
the respondent is asked to answer the sensitive question, or
whether the respondent is asked to give a predetermined
answer, either ‘yes’ or ‘no,’ regardless of the true answer to
the sensitive question (Horvitz et al. 1976). Confidentiality is
maintained because the interviewer does not know whether
the respondent was instructed to answer the sensitive question
or instructed to give the predetermined answer. Because the
probabilities of the randomization device are known, the
proportion of the population with the sensitive attribute can
be estimated through probabilistic logic. Fox and Tracy (1986)
explained the method through the use of a die: the participant
is instructed to say ‘yes’ if a one is rolled (P2), to say ‘no’ if
a two or three is rolled (P3), and to respond to the sensitive
question, ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer, if a four, five, or six is rolled
(P1). In this case, the ratio of the population with the
nonsensitive attribute is 0.33, given by 
(1)
 The result of the die is unknown by the interviewer so the
reason for the answer also remains unknown, but can be
estimated. Researchers have developed randomizing devices
that allow the probabilities to be varied and therefore increase
the accuracy of estimates of the sensitive attribute (Abernathy
et al. 1970). The RRT provides a simple and cost-effective
tool for estimating compliance levels and facilitates further
investigation of the factors that lead to compliance behaviors. 
The study was conducted in Townsville, Australia, the most
populated city along the Great Barrier Reef coast (Queensland
Treasury and Trade 2012). The minor geographical variation
in recreational fishers’ characteristics within the GBR area
(Sutton 2008, De Freitas et al. 2013) suggests that Townsville
recreational fishers are representative of the wider population
of recreational fishers in the GBR. Surveys of randomly
selected recreational fishers were conducted at Townsville’s
main boat ramp every weekend and randomly selected
weekdays during May and June 2009. When approaching
potential interviewees, the interviewer identified himself as a
university student conducting a short, i.e., 5-10 minute,
anonymous survey on recreational fishing. Fishers who were
encountered multiple times were not reinterviewed.  
The questionnaire was designed to be administered on-site and
collect information about recreational fishers’ beliefs and
attitudes about compliance and enforcement with zoning in
the GBRMP (Table 1). A RRT section about compliance with
no-take zones was asked at the end of the survey. Before the
RRT section, fishers were told that the next part of the survey
involved a question that some could deem as ‘sensitive’ and
then were asked if they wished to proceed. Interviewees were
unaware of the content of the sensitive question before
deciding to participate. If the participant refused, they were
thanked for participating and the survey ended. Respondents
who agreed to proceed to the sensitive question were reminded
that the interviewer was not a government employee, that their
name was not requested, and that the survey was part of a
university study. The interviewer then explained that a special
method was being used to ensure confidentiality.  
Similar to Abernathy et al. (1970), a plastic screw-top
container filled with 80 beads of 6 colors was used as a
randomizing device (Fig. 1). A trap mechanism exposed one
bead to a clear window when the device was tipped. A list of
instructions was attached to the lid. A red or pink bead required
the respondent to answer with a ‘no,’ blue or green, a ‘yes,’
and gold or white led to the sensitive question: “Have you,
knowingly, fished in a Green Zone in the Great Barrier Reef
Marine Park during the last 12 months?” 
The method and the reason it provides confidentiality was
succinctly explained to participants. Further explanation was
given to participants who appeared or admitted to being
confused. During the explanation, the question was covered
with dark adhesive tape to prevent the participant from reading
it. Once the explanation was complete, the adhesive tape
covering the question was removed and the device was handed
to the participant. The participant was then instructed to tilt
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Table 1. Questionnaire items, responses and comparison between 'yes' vs. 'no' respondents to the RRT question.
 
Questions Responses P-value for comparison of 'yes' vs.
'no' respondents.
1 Townsville resident? 95% residents 0.933
2 Approximately how many times have you gone fishing during
the last 12 months?
16.8 days (average) 0.312
3 Compared to other recreation activities that you do in the
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park (such as boating, diving,
swimming, etc.), would you say fishing is:
74% most important activity, 8% second most important
activity, 2% third most important activity, 17% one of
many
0.95
4 How knowledgeable are you about the location of Green
Zones in the areas you like to fish?
54% very knowledgeable, 41% moderately
knowledgeable, 5% not at all knowledgeable
0.516
5 What do you think would happen to a fisher who is caught by
park/wildlife officers fishing in a Green Zone?
79% fines, 28% confiscation of property, 13% court
hearing, 8% warning, 8% jail
0.686
6 How concerned would you feel if you saw a recreational
fisher fishing a Green Zone near your favorite spot?
47% very concerned, 45% moderately concerned, 8% not
at all concerned
0.643
7 How likely would you be to report such activity? 29% very, 45% moderately, 26% not at all 0.114
8 In general, how supportive of the 2004 Great Barrier Reef
Zoning Plan are you today?
41% strongly supportive, 33% somewhat supportive,
17% neutral, 5% somewhat opposed, 4% strongly
opposed
0.496
9 Degree of agreement: Limiting fishing grounds by the use of
Green Zones can lead to a healthy Great Barrier Reef in the
future.
67% agree, 24% neutral, 10% disagree 0.604
10 Degree of agreement: The Zoning Plan helps ensure
sustainable recreational fisheries in the GBR.
76% agree, 15% neutral, 9% disagree 0.817
11 What do you think is the level of compliance with green zones
in the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park by recreational fishers?
12% very high compliance, 48% high compliance, 35%
moderate compliance, 2% low compliance, 3% very low
compliance
0.058
Rank 1st: Fines 0.345
Ranked 2nd: Fishery and other benefits 0.803
Ranked 3rd: Disapproval by other people 0.118
12 In your opinion, which is the most important factor that would
encourage people to comply with Green Zones? (rank)
Ranked 1st:High fish numbers 0.386
Ranked 2nd: Impact is not that big 0.935
Ranked 3rd: Unlikely to get caught by authorities 0.371
13 In your opinion, which is the most important factor that would
encourage people to not comply with Green Zones? (rank)
14 How important do you think it is to measure compliance with
green zones in the GBR?
59% very important, 40% moderately important, 1% not
important
0.205
15 Do you personally know anybody who has intentionally
fished a Green Zone?
92% no, 8% yes 0.032
RRT
16 How comfortable do you believe friends of yours would be in
answering truthfully using this method?
72% very comfortable, 26% moderately comfortable, 1%
not comfortable
0.295
17 Did you feel comfortable in answering truthfully using this
method?
99.3% very comfortable, 0.7% uncomfortable 0.01
18 Did you understand why this method ensures your
confidentiality?
92.6% yes, 7.4% no 0.01
Fig. 1. Decision tree (adapted from Chaloupka, 1985)
the container to trap one bead and then answer only ‘yes’ or
‘no,’ without revealing to the interviewer the color of the bead,
or whether they had been instructed by the device to answer
the sensitive question. Finally, the respondent was asked to
tilt or shake the device, which would remove the bead from
the window, before returning it to the researcher.  
After using the randomizing device and ensuring that all
participants had read and understood the nature of the sensitive
question, the researcher restated why the method was being
used and how it ensured confidentiality. Subsequently, three
nonsensitive questions were asked to elicit the participant’s
comfort with and his/her understanding of the RRT. The
estimated proportion of participants who had knowingly
fished within a no-take zone in the GBRMP over the previous
12 months and the variance for the estimate were calculated
using formulas provided by Horvitz et al. (1976; Appendix 1).
To explore differences between compliers and noncompliers
with GBR zoning, Mann-Whitney tests were used to test for
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differences between participants who answered ‘yes’ and
those who answered ‘no’ in the RRT exercise. Group
differences were tested for variables regarding knowledge,
attitudes, and beliefs about compliance in the GBRMP and
level of comfort with and understanding of the RRT. Because
of the exploratory nature of the study and because the RRT
introduces additional variability into the data, statistical
significance was set at alpha = 0.1. Statistical software used
was SPSS Version 20.
RESULTS
Of the 144 fishers who participated in the survey (response
rate = 78%), 88% of respondents were male, and 95% were
residents of Townsville. The average number of days fished
in the last 12 months by respondents was 16.8 (range 1 to 60
days; median = 12 days). Approximately 75% of respondents
rated fishing as their most important GBR activity. Fishers
reported being ‘very’ (54%) to ‘moderately’ (41%)
knowledgeable of the location of no-take zones in the areas
they likes to fish. Of the respondents, 74% reported being
supportive of the GBRMP zoning plan, whereas 9% were
opposed. Most fishers reported believing that there was a
positive effect on fisheries and sustainability associated with
no-take zones (76% agree) and the zoning plan in general (67%
agree). 
Fishers were asked an open-ended question to gauge their
beliefs about the legal implications of getting caught by
authorities while fishing in a no-take zone. The most
commonly cited implications were: fines, cited by 79% of
respondents; confiscation of property, e.g., gear, boat, trailer,
28%; court hearing, 13%; warning, 8%; and jail, 8%. Fishers
were presented with a list of three potential drivers for
compliance and noncompliance with no-take zones and asked
to rank them in order of importance. The possibility of being
fined was the highest ranked compliance driver (mean rank =
1.44), followed by the belief that no-take zones have benefits
to the fishery and the wider ecosystem (mean rank = 2.01),
and finally, the belief that others would disapprove of fishing
in no-take zones (mean rank = 2.55). The perception that there
are more fish in no-take zones was the highest ranked
noncompliance driver (mean rank = 1.76), followed by the
belief that the impact of recreational fishing in no-take zones
is not significant (mean rank = 2.07), and finally, the low
perceived likelihood of being caught (mean rank = 2.17).
When asked if there were any other important factors affecting
compliance, 5% of fishers mentioned education as an
additional factor fostering compliance; conversely, 17%
mentioned ignorance of zoning regulations as a
noncompliance driver. 
Most fishers reported that they would be ‘very’ (47%) or
‘moderately’ (45%) concerned if they saw a recreational fisher
fishing in a no-take zone near their favorite fishing spot.
Fishers also reported that they would be ‘very’ (29%) or
‘moderately’ (45%) likely to report observed noncompliance
within no-take zones to the authorities. Fishers believed that
compliance with the GBRMP zoning plan by recreational
fishers is ‘very high’ (30%), ‘high’ (30%), or ‘moderate’
(35%). Recreational fishers reported that it is ‘very’ (59%) to
‘moderately’ (40%) important to measure compliance with
no-take zones in the GBRMP. When directly asked “Do you
personally know anybody who has intentionally fished in a
Green Zone?” 8% of recreational fishers responded
affirmatively. 
The RRT section of the survey was answered by 136
interviewees (94%). Of those who participated in the RRT
question to estimate the compliance rate with no-take zones,
118 (87%) respondents answered ‘no’ and 18 (13%)
respondents answered ‘yes.’ Using the RRT estimators, which
adjust for the probability of a respondent being directed by the
device to answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’, resulted in an estimated
proportion of the population who knowingly fished in no-take
zones over the past 12 months of 9.70% (95% CI = 9.64 to
9.76). When asked if they felt comfortable answering
truthfully using the RRT, 99% of respondents said ‘yes’, and
93% claimed to understand why the method ensured their
confidentiality. Of the respondents, 72% believed that other
recreational fishers would feel ‘very comfortable’ in
answering truthfully by using the RRT.  
We detected several differences between ‘yes’ and ‘no’
respondents in the RRT question (Table 1). Respondents who
answered ‘no’ were more likely to understand why the RRT
ensured their confidentiality than those who answered ‘yes’
(95% vs. 78%, respectively; p = 0.01). Likewise, respondents
who answered ‘no’ were more likely to report being
comfortable answering truthfully using the RRT method than
were respondents who answered ‘yes’ (100% vs. 94 %,
respectively; p = 0.01). ‘Yes’ respondents were more likely to
report knowing somebody who had intentionally fished a no-
take zone than were ‘no’ respondents (22% vs. 7%,
respectively; p = 0.032). ‘No’ respondents were more likely
to perceive higher compliance levels than ‘yes’ respondents
(66% vs. 33%, respectively; p = 0.058).
DISCUSSION
Using a customized Random Response Technique, we were
able to provide an estimate of the percentage (~10%) of
recreational fishers in the Townsville region of the GBRMP
who knowingly did not comply with no-take zones in the
preceding 12 month period. The time and financial costs of
providing this estimate were very low compared to other
potential methods of estimating compliance in the GBRMP,
e.g., on-water monitoring and aerial surveillance. Moreover,
results suggest that most recreational fishers surveyed
understood how the RRT protected their confidentiality and
felt comfortable answering compliance related questions with
this method. Although compliance levels estimated through
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social surveys, including surveys employing RRT, are prone
to overestimation because of response bias, it is likely that the
RRT-derived estimate we derived is less biased than if the
estimate had been derived from direct questioning (Lensvelt-
Mulders et al. 2005). Overall, the results suggest that the RRT
is an appropriate tool for measuring recreational fishers’
compliance with no-take zones and potentially with other
fishing regulations, e.g., size and bag limits, in the GBRMP. 
Results suggest that only a small minority (< 10%) of
recreational fishers in the Townsville region knowingly fished
in GBRMP no-take zones. Previous studies using direct
observations have also suggested that “measurable but low
levels of illegal recreational fishing occur within no-take
zones” in the GBRMP (Davis et al. 2004:373). It should be
noted, however, that even low levels of illegal fishing can
degrade marine protected areas’ effectiveness (Little et al.
2005), hence illegal fishing effort is an important variable to
consider. For example, in just four weeks and using hook and
line, Harrison et al. (2012) captured, tagged, and released a
quarter of the coral trout (Plectropomus maculatus) and a third
of stripey snapper (Lutjanus carponotatus) adult populations
within three no-take zones in the GBR; this underlines how
localized and intensive fishing effort can quickly erode reserve
benefits (Roberts 2012). Indeed, a small number of
noncompliers fishing at high effort levels can account for
considerable environmental damage, particularly if vulnerable
species, e.g., sharks (Graham et al. 2010), or vulnerable
individuals, e.g., fish spawning aggregations (Sadovy and
Domeier 2005), are targeted. Our compliance estimate does
not provide an indication of recreational fishing effort within
no-take zones. However, RRT can be modified to estimate
illegal fishing efforts and to analyze factors such as compliance
with fishery regulations such as quotas and legal sizes (Blank
and Gavin 2009). We emphasize that to inform adaptive
management in the GBRMP, and other protected areas, a
systematic application of compliance studies is required for
estimating and understanding compliance levels, illegal
fishing efforts, and their variability through space and time.
Recent social and economic monitoring projects in the GBR
(see projects 8.1 and 10.2 in NERP 2011) may present
opportunities to integrate and further develop compliance
studies.  
We found that concern about receiving a penalty was the most
important driver of compliance in no-take zones.
Nevertheless, compliance levels mostly dependent on
enforcement require a strong authority presence, which
translates into high operation costs (Keane et al. 2008, Ban et
al. 2011). The high awareness level related to fines may be
caused by government efforts to educate for compliance,
which at the time of this study emphasized the illegality of
fishing in no-take zones. However, despite awareness about
fines, fishers’ perceptions of the legal implications of fishing
in no-take zones were inaccurate. Nearly 30% of respondents
believed, erroneously, that property confiscation would result
if they were caught fishing in no-take zones. This lack of
awareness of actual sanctions is not surprising given the
diversity of agencies and regulations involved in management
and enforcement in the GBRMP (GBRMPA 2009,
Kenchington and Day 2011). Although the perception that
sanctions are more severe than they actually are appears to be
having a positive effect on compliance levels, reliance on
misperceptions to promote compliance may not be a viable
strategy for two reasons. First, complex management
arrangements can generate confusion among users and even
managers, potentially undermining compliance and
enforcement (Akella and Cannon 2004). Second, one must
question whether the motivation for compliance would remain
should misinformed fishers eventually learn that the penalties
for noncompliance are not as severe as they believed. We
believe that compliance based on penalties and/or
misperceptions is not compatible with ongoing efforts to
strengthen compliance in the GBRMP. 
Few studies compare methods for estimating compliance
levels (Gavin et al. 2010). We compared perceived
compliance, i.e., fishers’ beliefs about their peers’ compliance
levels, and if they personally knew someone who intentionally
fished in a no-take zone, and compliance estimated by RRT.
We found that fishers’ perceptions of compliance levels were
similar to our estimate of compliance derived from RRT. Other
authors have recently gauged perceived compliance in marine
protected areas, finding correlations with ecological health
(Pollnac et al. 2010) and management arrangements, such as
graduated sanctions (Cinner et al. 2012). Collectively, these
results suggest that recreational fishers’ perceptions of
compliance levels could be a valuable source of information
that could easily be incorporated in socioeconomic monitoring
programs. It should be noted, however, that our measures of
perceived compliance were not measured on a temporal scale,
unlike our RRT measure, which estimated compliance for the
previous 12 months; therefore, we recommend more research
to determine the accuracy and effectiveness of this measure. 
We found a difference between the levels of perceived
compliance among ‘yes’ and ‘no’ respondents, suggesting that
respondents who engage in noncompliance are more likely to
believe that other recreational fishers also fish illegally in no-
take zones. These results may be attributable to the false
consensus effect, i.e., a person’s tendency to overestimate the
normality of their own behavior (Ross et al. 1977, Mullen and
Hu 1988). An important implication of this finding is that
fishers who believe that many others fish illegally could feel
less pressure to comply (Dawes et al. 1977).  
We suggest that normative drivers, e.g., peer pressure,
legitimacy, and awareness, could be further exploited to
increase voluntary compliance in the GBRMP (Alder 1996).
For example, we found that peer pressure is present and can
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be bolstered: 92% of participants reported they would feel
‘very’ to ‘moderately’ concerned if they saw someone fishing
a no-take zone near their favorite fishing spot, and 74% were
‘very’ to ‘moderately’ likely to report such behavior to
authorities. Communication campaigns could potentiate the
effect of peer pressure on compliance by underlining the
ecological benefits of fishers’ compliance with zoning
regulations and encouraging reporting of noncompliance
through the existing ‘Eyes and Ears’ incident reporting
program. Such campaigns could increase awareness,
stewardship, and the probability of detection for those who do
not comply. Additionally, the public shame as well as the
private guilt of being reputed as a noncompliant free-rider can
pose a strong dissuasive effect, that could, and should, be offset
with the public and private pride of being compliant (Whatley
et al. 1999, Cialdini and Goldstein 2004).
CONCLUSION
We present a set of useful tools and possible directions for
future compliance studies in the GBRMP and other marine
protected areas. The RRT is a robust tool for analyzing fishers’
compliance through social surveys. Our results indicate that
adequate compliance levels are possible even if they are based
mostly on rational compliance drivers, e.g., fines and
enforcement. To achieve a higher degree of voluntary
compliance, we advise additional use of normative drivers, i.
e., managers should aim for resource users to comply because
it is ‘the right thing to do,’ not to avoid penalties. In this case,
erroneous beliefs about the consequences of being caught
fishing in a no-take zone seem to play a role in influencing
compliance levels; the relationship between erroneous beliefs
and compliance presents an interesting venue for future
research in natural resource management. The observed
relationship between fishers’ perceived compliance and RRT
results should be further investigated to test the potential of
perceived compliance as a proxy for compliance levels.
Fishers’ compliance will influence conservation outcomes;
the extent of this influence and whether positive or negative,
depends greatly on management decisions. We aim to
encourage the expansion of compliance studies and the
recognition of users’ compliance as an underpinning factor in
natural resource management.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/5872
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Appendix 1. Formulas used for RRT data. See Horvitz et al. (1976) for more detail. 
 
The proportion of the population (n) with the non-sensitive attribute (  ) is given by (1). 
    
  
       
  
  
      
                                 (1) 
The proportion of the population with the sensitive attribute (  ) when (  ) is known, is estimated by 
(2); with P being the probability of selecting the sensitive attribute (P=  ) and    being the observed P of 
“yes” in the RRT section. 
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The variance is given by (3), with   being the probability of a “yes” response (                 
var        
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